Fourth amendment typographical error on warrant

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Court has recognized “the exigencies of the situation” as an exception to the warrant requirement, which “make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 1 Footnote
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) ; see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that “police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home” ); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ( “[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” ). Exigent circumstances requires a court “to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.” 2 Footnote
Riley v. California , 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014) . The Court has identified several types of circumstances that give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search, including a search incident to arrest,3 Footnote
See Amdt4.6.4.1 Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine. law enforcement’s need to provide emergency aid,4 Footnote
Michigan v. Fisher , 558 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2009) (per curiam); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) ( “Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police.” ). “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect,5 Footnote
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) ; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. 438, 456 (2016) ( “The exigent circumstances exception allows a warrantless search when an emergency leaves police insufficient time to seek a warrant. It permits, for instance, the warrantless entry of private property when there is a need to provide urgent aid to those inside, when police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and when police fear the imminent destruction of evidence.” ); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509–10 (1979) (recognizing entering a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause constitutes exigent circumstances). and the prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence.6 Footnote
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40–41 (1963) ; see Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403 ; Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116, n. 6, (2006) ; Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) . See also Amdt4.6.4.1 Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine and Amdt4.6.4.2 Vehicle Searches. In situations absent dangerous and life-threatening circumstances, the Court recognizes that warrantless searches are permissible in circumstances where “there is a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” 7 Footnote
Tyler , 436 U.S. at 509 .

The Court has refused to adopt a categorical rule as to what circumstances constitutes an exigency and, instead, applies a case-by-case analysis dependent on “all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” 8 Footnote
Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 151–52 (2013) ; Cf. id. at 150, n. 3 (discussing “a limited class of traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement that apply categorically and thus do not require an assessment of whether the policy justifications underlying the exception” ); but see Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403 (listing prior holdings that found exigent circumstances) To determine whether exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search, the Court “looks to the totality of circumstances.” 9 Footnote
McNeely , 569 U.S. at 149 ; see also City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006) In rendering emergency assistance, the officer must have “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an individual within the home was in need of immediate assistance.10 Footnote
Fisher , 558 U.S. at 47 (per curiam) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) ). When the police, in executing a warrantless search, have not created the exigency in question, the Court has held that such “warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.” 11 Footnote
Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011) ; id. at 470 ( “Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency.” ); see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42 (1963) (upholding a warrantless search of an apartment, finding that “[t]he officers had reason to act quickly because of Ker’s furtive conduct and the likelihood that the marijuana would be distributed or hidden before a warrant could be obtained at that time of night” ). In contrast, the Court in Johnson v. United States rejected the government’s claim that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of an individual’s home.12 Footnote
333 U.S. 10 (1948) . In Johnson , the police gained entry into the suspect’s home after a “demand[ ] under color of office.” 13 Footnote
Id. at 13 . The Court, in rejecting the government’s claim that the search was conducted because of the “opium smell in the room,” held that the government offered no reason “for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate.” 14 Footnote
Id. at 15 . The Court reasoned that “[t]hese are never very convincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly are not enough to by-pass the constitutional requirement. No suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction, except perhaps the fumes which [the Court] suppose[d] in time would disappear.” 15 Footnote
Id.

In terms of determining the reasonableness for the police to proceed without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a suspect, the Court has held that, in such circumstances, “the need to act quickly . . . is even greater . . . while the intrusion is much less.” 16 Footnote
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) ; See id. at 43 ( “[A] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a private place.” ); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297–98 (1967) For example, the Court has held that the “ Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.” 17 Footnote
Warden , 387 U.S. at 298–99 . In Lange v. California , the Court reiterated that the exigent circumstances exception is generally applied on a “case-by-case basis,” 18 Footnote
No. 20-18, slip op. at 4 (U.S. June 23, 2021) . and declined to hold that pursuing a misdemeanor suspect categorically qualifies as an exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement.19 Footnote
Id. at 16 .

Footnotes 1 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) ; see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that “police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home” ); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ( “[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” ). 2 Riley v. California , 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014) . 3 See Amdt4.6.4.1 Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine. 4 Michigan v. Fisher , 558 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2009) (per curiam); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) ( “Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police.” ). 5 United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) ; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. 438, 456 (2016) ( “The exigent circumstances exception allows a warrantless search when an emergency leaves police insufficient time to seek a warrant. It permits, for instance, the warrantless entry of private property when there is a need to provide urgent aid to those inside, when police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and when police fear the imminent destruction of evidence.” ); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509–10 (1979) (recognizing entering a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause constitutes exigent circumstances). 6 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40–41 (1963) ; see Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403 ; Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116, n. 6, (2006) ; Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) . See also Amdt4.6.4.1 Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine and Amdt4.6.4.2 Vehicle Searches. 7 Tyler , 436 U.S. at 509 . 8 Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 151–52 (2013) ; Cf. id. at 150, n. 3 (discussing “a limited class of traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement that apply categorically and thus do not require an assessment of whether the policy justifications underlying the exception” ); but see Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403 (listing prior holdings that found exigent circumstances) 9 McNeely , 569 U.S. at 149 ; see also City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006) 10 Fisher , 558 U.S. at 47 (per curiam) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) ). 11 Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011) ; id. at 470 ( “Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency.” ); see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42 (1963) (upholding a warrantless search of an apartment, finding that “[t]he officers had reason to act quickly because of Ker’s furtive conduct and the likelihood that the marijuana would be distributed or hidden before a warrant could be obtained at that time of night” ). 12 333 U.S. 10 (1948) . 13 Id. at 13 . 14 Id. at 15 . 15 Id. 16 United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) ; See id. at 43 ( “[A] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a private place.” ); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297–98 (1967) 17 Warden , 387 U.S. at 298–99 . 18 No. 20-18, slip op. at 4 (U.S. June 23, 2021) . 19 Id. at 16 .